NIETZSCHE’S TENSION OF THE SPIRIT
Philosophy
Introduction
Nietzsche’s book Beyond Good and Evil explores different tensions and contradictions in early modern life and in Western philosophy. One such tension that is seminal to understanding the work as a whole is his ““magnificent tension of the spirit” between the “will to truth” and the “will to value” (BGE Preface).Using textual evidence from BGE, this paper seeks to first unpack the basics of the “tension of the spirit,” then argue for both a Nietzschian “truth drive” and a Nietzschian “value drive,” then finish by providing examples from BGE of philosophers exhibiting this “tension.”
Background
Nietzsche’s introduction opens BGE with the concept of “the magnificent tension of the spirit” composed of a “will to truth” and a “will to value” (BGE Preface). Before explaining the “will to truth” and a “will to value,” it is necessary to understand this tension of the spirit by defining the spirit and understanding the type of tension that is present. The word which Nietzsche uses for tension in the German is “Geist.” Geist is literally translated as “the spirit of an individual or group” but specifically implies the mental, the life of the mind, or conscious thinking. Thus, Nietzsche argues that there is great tension in consciousness (geist) of the Western and free-thinking person (BGE Preface). Nietzsche uses the metaphor of the “bow” to express this tension, calling it a “tense [..] bow” which can “shoot for the most distant targets.” This implies that while there is struggle and even “a state of distress” within in the European's geist caused by the tension of this metaphorical bow and string, this tension is a state of deep potential which can “shoot” society forward or and towards a noble “target” (BGE Preface).
Nietzsche hints at the two opposing aspects of the tension within the geist by giving the examples of “Jesuits” and “democratic enlightenment” who are both trying to ease the tension. The first example he uses are the Jesuits. The Jesuits, a branch of the Catholic church, try to ease the tension by undermining scientific advances. The Jesuits defended their Christian and life-orienting ideals (or ethical values) from the onslaught of scientific evidence contrary to their literal interpretations of the Bible by adhering to Biblical dogma. This dogmatic adherence completely rejected scientific discoveries of truth in the world in favor of values espoused in the Bible and authority figures (like the Pope). This kind of dogmatism mirrors the Platonists dogmatism Nietzsche mentioned earlier in the text, calling the Christinity-ecclesiatiocal” tradition “Platonism for the people'' (BGE Preface). In both of these examples, life-orienting ethical values completely eclipse any opposition from truths found in the material world.
While the democratic enlightenment also eased the tension of the “bow,” it did so by undermining the need for “spirit.” Specifically, Nietzsche states that “freedom of the press and the reading of newspapers, achieve a state of affairs in which the spirit would no longer so easily feel itself to be a “need”! (BGE Preface). This excerpt reveals not only Nietzsche’s understanding of what the democratic enlightenment has done for (or to depending on how one reads it) society, but also his elitist stance regarding matters of the geist. Nietzsche believes that the “democratic enlightenment” of his era was an ideology facilitated by mechanisms such as “freedom of press” and “newspapers.” Based on Nietzsche’s analogy of gunpowder, the ideology itself seems to be an attempt to make all opinions equal. This is where Nietzsche’s elitism becomes evident. In his eyes when all opinions and values become equal, they are meaningless. Not every person with an opinion is correct, but the dogma of democratic enlightenment cannot filter this. Inflation is a helpful (though not perfect) metaphor here. When more money is printed each bill is worth less. When the inflation reaches a certain point (hyperinflation), the bills become worthless and the entire system collapses. Similarly, the equalization of value-claims makes each value-claim worth less. This proceeds until value-claims are all worthless and the entire “value” system collapses (or in Nietzsche’s terms are no longer a “need”). Thus, the democratic enlightenment undermines the geist (or conscious thinking) until people feel that they do not need to think through the tension, for all values are the same and ethical claims are meaningless.
So, while the dogmatic Jesuits completely reject scientific reality, the dogmatic democratic enlightenment devalues ethical values by stating that they are all equal (when in reality they are not). Nietzsche argues that the “free spirits'' who have not fallen to either of these tension-releasing dogmas feel the need for both values (found in the geist) and the truths (brought about by advances in science). For these individuals, both sides of the “magnificent tension” remains. More than that, this tension has potential for progress . These specific examples in Nietzsche’s exposition of the “magnificent tension” imply a more fundamental idea: the struggle between the “will to truth” and the “will to value”
Truth Drive and Value Drive
This section will explain “will to truth” (WTT) and the “will to value” (WTV), explain Nietzsche’s drives, and then argue that the WTT is a “truth drive” and the WTV is a “value drive.” These two wills or drives are necessary to understand because they make up the tension of the soul.
As foreshadowed in the Preface, WTT is a will to understand definite realities about the world as it truly is. As seen in the Preface, the Jesuits abandoned the WTT in favor of their value-based dogma. They no longer cared to understand the definite reality about the world. One way to frame WTT is that it attempts to answer the “what” questions of life. Science, metaphysics, logic, math, etc. are all fields that attempt to define what the world is (or will towards the truth in the world).
WTV, on the other hand, is a will to understand the world based on one’s ethical framework or value hierarchy. Again using the example of the Jesuits, it seems that they abandoned the WTT for the WTV. This value-based dogma which they so strictly adhered to painted the world in a way that would allow for their moral system, ideals, and value claims. The WTV, then, can be understood as answering the “why” questions of life. Fields such as moral philosophy, theology, art, and literature attempt the answer value-based issues such as why humans exist or why humans should act a certain way. Thus, while WTT answers “what” the WTV imposes “why.”
Having understood the WTT and WTV respectively, the reason why both of these are considered by Nietzsche to be drives is because these wills act how drives act: tyrannically. Nietzsche first claims that each philosophy reflects the “unconscious memoir” of each philosopher who wrote it. For Nietzsche, these “unconscious memoir[s]”are the formalization and/or justification of their “drives” (BGE 6). Thus, each philosophy is a “drive.” Nietzsche then claims that each of these drives are tryrnacial, attempting to “present itself as the ultimate goal of existence and the legitimate master of all other drives” (BGE 6). As we have seen in the Preface, and as we will see in the examples to follow, where the WTT is pursued, the WTV is excluded. Where the WTV is pursued the WTT is excluded. While Nietzsche, in the end, does have a solution to the tyranny of “drives,” it is already clear that both the WTT is a “truth drive” and the WTV is a “value-drive.” While this is an abstract explanation, studying the positivists and the Stoics in BGE will provide a concrete understanding of drives in action.
Positivism and Stoicism
The positivist exemplifies a worldview pursuing the WTT, with a desire for absolute certainty and an end in nihilism. The Stoic exemplifies a worldview pursuing the WTV, with a desire to project their ethical value system onto the world and an end with incoherence/ disconnect from reality. Each of these examples highlight issues with dogmatic philosophies unaware of their drives. It becomes clear that a worldview that only answers the “what” questions or only answers the “why” questions is insufficient; the “magnificent tension of the spirit” is lost and the metaphorical arrow cannot be shot forward.
To fully understand positivism's relation to WTT, one must understand positivism, understand why someone would turn to positivism, and understand the shortcomings of positivism. Positivism is the worldview that “ every rationally justifiable assertion can be scientifically verified or is capable of logical or mathematical proof, and that therefore rejects metaphysics and theism” (Oxford Language). This is to say that anything non-material is false. This total and absolute stance leads to questions about morality and value in general. In which molecules can one find value? In what physical law is morality found in? These questions do not have answers. Nietzsche goes as far as to say that regardless of how “noble” this attempt is to describe the world, it ultimately leads to“nihilism” (BGE 10).
Why would anyone prescribe to positivism if it is a nihilistic worldview? Nietzsche argues that it draws a person with a certain drive: the “truth drive,” the drive of utter certainty. He puts it elegantly by stating these individuals “prefer a handful of ‘certainty’ to a whole cartful of beautiful possibilities; [... and] would rather lie down and die on a sure nothing than on an uncertain something” (BGE 10). This is the cost of positivism and, more generally an absolute “truth drive.” In answering “what,” they completely ignore or reject “why.” Thus, positivism showcases how the WTT can be a tyrannical drive, lording over the WTV and all other drives. It reveals how, when one drive rules over the rest, the “magnificent tension” is lost in a hollow way. On the other end of the spectrum, but demonstrating the same concept, the Stoics pursue the WTV.
To understand Stoicisim’s relation to the WTV one must understand what Stoicism is and the errors of a Stoic worldview. While nuanced, the key aspect of Stoic philosophy which Nietzsche focuses on is living “according to nature.” What this means for Stoics is “indifference,” particularly in the face of hardship and suffering. This philosophy is still relevant today, with many “self-help” programs based loosely on Stoic philosophy. The issue, Nietzsche argues, is that “nature” is actually in direct opposition to “life” (BGE 9). He describes nature as “prodigal” (or wasteful), “indifferent,” “without aims or inventions,” and “without mercy or justice” (BGE 9). On the contrary, Nietzsche claims that life is, at its base level, “valuating, preferring, being unjust, being limited, [and] wanting to be different” (BGE 9). What Nietzsche is saying is that humans have a uniquely concerful and purposeful relationship to life. Even if this is not something one strives for, humankind inescapably exists in a spiderweb of meaning and meaning-making. This places “life” in direct opposition to “nature.”
The Stoic solution to this contradiction is to paint nature, or more fundamentally reality, in the vein of their own moral system. Nietzsche claims that rather than seeing how nature truly is, they prescribe “nature ‘according to the Stoa’” (BGE 9). This dogmatic view taints their understanding of reality, causing them to “view nature falsely, namely Stoically, [and] are no longer capable of viewing it in any other way” (BGE 9). This is a clear example of a tyrannical “value drive” that is all consuming, distorting, and as Nietzsche says, “false” (BGE 9). In their will towards a value system, the Stoics ignore pertinent facets of reality when making claims about reality. In doing so, this drive not only tyrannically rules over the WTT and other drives, but falsely “create[s] the world in their own image” (BGE 9).
Conclusion: Perspectivism
In short, Nietzsche’s “magnificent tension of the spirit” consists of the WTT and the WTV, both of which are tyrannical drives as exemplified by positivism and Stoicism. The tension is caused on the one hand by why issues (ethics, values, etc.) and on the other hand by what issues (truth of nature, science). Nietzsche’s examples throughout BGE provide compelling evidence that a worldview ruled by one or the other drive is incomplete.
Yet the question remains: What is Nietzsche’s answer to this tension? Is he not also positing a worldview? If he is positing a worldview, won’t this philosophy also have his personal “drives” present? His solution to this issue is not to avoid “drives” (for that is impossible), but to be critically reflective of them. His antidote to dogmatism, which tyrannical “drives” have such a propensity to fall under the spell of, is perspectivism. Perspectivistm is the view that there is no singular, fully detached or objective truth and that there is no culturally unbounded, universal value-system. By keeping this in mind, one can understand her own “drives” and choose the best one.
Thus, what arrow should be strung to this bow of “great tension” in order to strike the target of a greater future? A “new philosoph[y]” that, through perspectivism, can both affirm ethical values and be close to the truth of the world (BGE 2).