AUGUSTINE’S INFLUENCE ON ANSELM: THE INCORRUPATABILITY OF GOD TO THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

Philosophy, Theology

Part 1: Introduction and Reconstruction

In the Confessions, Augustine argues against the Manacheian idea that there is an anti-God. The first premise in his argument is that God is incorruptible, which he explains in detail by way of another argument. Upon examination, one finds that while Augustine’s argument for the incorruptibility of God is not an attempt to prove God, it contributes heavily (especially in form) to Anselm’s ontological attempt to prove God. This makes Agusitne’’s argument relevant to an understanding of Anslem’s most well-known argument for the existence of God. Thus, this paper will look at the structure and context regarding Augustine’s argument for the incorruptibility of God. Agustine’s argument for the incorruptibility of God is found in Confessions VII, iv, 6 (pp. 114–115) as follows:

Simplified and in my own words, the argument breaks down to the following:

Overview

Before diving into the premises, I will explain the structure of the argument. Premise (1), defended elsewhere in Augustine’s work is essentially a claim that a > b. Premise (2) argues, very similarly to Anselm, that “God is that which none are capable of conceiving anything better than.” For future reference, this will be abbreviated as ‘Ω.’ Inference Step (3) states that If ‘Ω’ had property b, then there would be something greater: ‘Ω’ with property a. This is because, based on (1), a>b. Inference Step (4) is directly derived from (2). Conclusion (5) comes to the conclusion that God is incorruptible based on modus tollens. The contradiction is that, based on (2), ‘Ω’ > anything else conceivable and b<a. ‘Ω’ must therefore have property a rather than property b.

Premise 1

Having explained the structure of the argument, I will explain the two premises and give reason to why one would believe these premises. For premise (1), Augustine seems to define corruptible not in the moral sense, but in the material sense. He states that something incorruptible is “immune from injury,” so I am led to believe that “corruptible” is in reference to harm, decay, or destruction (Confessions VII, p. 111). Some may argue that this premise is intuitively true. Take, for instance, a pop culture reference: Superman. Superman is functionally incorruptible. He cannot be harmed (outside of kryptonite), does not decay (in the yellow sun of the Earth), and cannot be destroyed (again aside from kryptonite). The only reason why a fictional character with this property (incorruptibility) would be elevated or labeled as “Super” is that it is greater in the human mind to be incorruptible. There was no need to explain to comic book readers or movie watchers why having bullets, bombs, and other forms of harm simply not effect Superman was better. The audience intuitively understood this. 

Yet, this intuitive explanation for the truth of Premise 1 is not by any means infallible for many reasons. First, intuition can be wrong. This is clearly documented on many levels and does not need in-depth explanation (just to name a few examples, consider optical illusions, drug-induced hallucination, racist preconceptions that are not true, etc.). Additionally, one could also argue that even in the intuitive sense, incorruptibility may not be greater than corruptibility. Let us, again, consider Superman as our example. While it is intuitive why Superman is considered “Super,” there is another sense in which he could be considered not so “Super,” or not “greater.” This sense is public perception. Though there are definite fans of Superman, there are also many people who do not like or value him specifically because of his incorruptibility. As a fictional character, it is far less likable, relatable, and interesting when Superman is incorruptible. Thus, one could say that in this case, incorruptibility detracts from Superman’s value or greatness.

While this is an interesting counterpoint, others would argue that, regardless of public perception, there is a sense in which incorruptibility is greater than corruptibility. The difference is the hierarchy on which incorruptibility sits. If it is in terms of self-preservation, for instance, incorruptibility is most definitely greater than corruptibility. If it is regarding social standing, this becomes less certain. Using this simple and somewhat niche/nerdy example, we can see that what matters to the believability of Premise 1 is the hierarchy of values that incorruptibility falls into. This hierarchy will be explained in-depth in Part 2 when discussing Augustine’s philosophical context. There we will see that not only does Augustine have a hierarchy upon which to place incorruptibility, but the Neoplatonic view is that this hierarchy is absolute and objective. For example, in the Neoplatonic hierarchy, while a cheetah could be greater than humans in terms of speed, humans are greater than cheetahs in an absolute sense. Thus, given the hierarchy that Augustine affirms, the counterarguments regarding social status are rendered moot. Without getting into excessive detail regarding the hierarchy, the claim that incorruptibility is greater than corruption seems to be tied with the idea that being is greater than not being. If something will always have being, it is greater than something may or may not always have being. To fully understand Premise 1, we must understand the Neoplatonic hierarchy. 

Premise 2

Here, I both explain Premise 2’s (‘Ω’) meaning and also consider Augstine’s formulation of ‘Ω’  in relation to St. Anselm’s formulation of ‘Ω.’ I will begin by explicating the various terms in Premise 2. First, in the original text, Augustine uses the term “any soul” (Confessions VII, iv, 6 pp. 114–115). While there are other places where Augustine explicitly explores the concept of the soul, stating in The Trinity that “man is a rational substance consisting of soul and body,” I interpret “soul” to simply be a rational being (Augustine, The Trinity, 464) . In my simplification of the text, use the word “none” in order to avoid any confusion or complication around the word soul. Yet, I argue that the “none” here must be a rational being because of both Augustine’s definition in The Trinity (“man is a rational substance …” ) and his use of the word “conceiving.” 

Like Anselm, Augustine uses the open and loose word of “cogitare” here in his construction of the premise. As it is in Anselm’s argument, cogitare has a weak and strong sense of “to have in mind” or the stronger sense of “to think through.” Additionally, in this excerpt, Augustine does not distinguish degrees of thought in the nuanced manner that Anselm does when making his argument. On either the strong or weak reading of Augustine’s use of cogitare, it seems that this broader category of “capable of conceiving” works in favor of Augustine and seems to inspire Anselm in his writing. 

Next, it seems relevant to explicate two related terms: “better than,” and “the highest and supreme good.” Better than here is “melius,” which is a comparative form of “bonus.” Just as it was in Anslem’s argument, melius here does not refer merely to quantity or quality, but rather to a particular Neoplatonic hierarchical understanding of being “good”-er. This Neoplatonic hierarchy will be elaborated on in Part 2, but it is worthy to note, here, that this Neoplatonic hierarchy is considered absolute, as explained at the end of the section discussing Premise 1. Additionally, “the highest and supreme good” is a translation of  “summum et optimum bonum es.” While the phrase “summum bonum” has extensive usage throughout the history of philosophy, it does not seem that this phrase is used in the exact way the Cicero intended it, but is somewhat closer (though not identical) to Plato’s usage of the Good. It seems here that Augustine is neither using it as Cicero would to denote the aim of actions which would lead to the best life. Rather,  Augustine uses it here to denote God as the highest good, though it does not seem as technical as Plato’s Form of the Good. The original-language understanding of both “better than” and “the highest and supreme good” both point to the Neoplatonic hierarchy which will be expanded on in Part 2. 

Having broken down the specific terms within Augustine’s ‘Ω’, it seems appropriate to compare the two uses of ‘Ω’ in context of their respective arguments. The primary difference is that Augustine seems to be working within the system of Christianity (making an internal argument) while Anselm is trying to prove the system of Christianity (making an external argument). Anslem’s adaptation and expansion of ‘Ω’  is an attempt to prove the existence of God. After asserting his argument, he then goes on to describe how the being described in ‘Ω’ has the perfections of God and therefore must, definitively, be the Christian God. Augustine, on the other hand, uses ‘Ω’ to argue for a specific perfection of God (incorruptibility) to prove the Christian God is different from the Manichaean God. Because ‘Ω’ is not trying to prove the very existence of God, but arguing for a perfection of God within an established system, Augustine’s ‘Ω’has a lighter philosophical burden. In my opinion, because 

 but is also more definitely convincing than Anselm’s 

Inference Steps (3), (4), and (5)

Having explained the two premises, I will now explain the three inference steps (which includes Conclusion step (5)). Note that some of the explanations have been started in the introduction section, so this portion will be slightly briefer than the last. This essay will go in order, explaining each inference step in the order it is written above. 

Inference step (3) follows the conditional statement structure, stating If (c), then (d). Here, (c) represents “God has property of corruptible (a). Here (d) represents “one could think of something better than God.” As stated in the brackets, inference step (3) draws from (1) for it’s context relating to corrubility and (2) relating to the greatness/betterness of God. In the parenthesis, (3) also suggests that ‘Ω’ with propterry (a) > ‘Ω’ with property (b). 

Inference step (4) utilizes the logical necessity to avoid contradiction to prove its point. Based on the very definition of Premise (2), the very structure of ‘Ω,’ nothing can be greater than the greatest good or more supreme than the most supreme good. These could be considered examples of analytic propositions rather than synthetic propositions, that are self-evident based on the meaning of the words regardless of the context. 

Conclusion step (5) is explained in some detail in the overview section, but to summarize and add on, because of the assertions and logical structures of inference steps (3) and (4) create a modus tollens contradiction, (5) must necessarily be the opposite of property (b) as asserted in inference step (3). For clarification, modus tollens follows the form of:

Replacing the given letters with what we have discussed here, the formula would be:

All told, this logical structure seems valid. If there are any issues it should be with Premises 1 or 2. In order to understand whether or not Premises 1 and 2 are convincing, one must understand the philosophical and theological context. 

 Part 2: Philosophical and Theological Context

Philosophical Context: Neoplatonic Ontological Hierarchy

Understanding Premise 1 is the key to understanding Augustine's argument as a whole. The rest of the argument is largely logical structure and, therefore, (though not impossible) is much harder to debatable over. While it may seem arbitrary, the key to understanding Premise 1 is understanding Augustine’s adaptation and expansion of the Neoplatonic hierarchy. 

When talking about the Neoplatonic ontological hierarchy, there are two parts that need to be discussed: the intelligible world and the sensible world. The intelligible world makes up the fundamental principles of the universe and are things that can be understood rationally. The intelligible world can be divided into three hypostases (which literally translates to something that stands under or a founding principle or foundation or fundment): the One, the Intellect, and the Soul. These three metaphysical principles are the basic building blocks upon which all of Neoplatonic ontological structure is built. In short, the One governs the principle of being, the Intellect makes the world intelligible, and the Soul creates motion (particularly self-motion). These three hypostases ground properties of things in the world. For instance, the One grounds anything with unity (or being), the Intellect grounds anything understandable (such as intellect or thoughts), and the Soul grounds things with self-motion (such as desire). Having established these three, Plotinus posits that there is inherently a hierarchy based on how the hypostateses relate to one another. He claims that the One (the being principle) generates Intellect (understandability) which generates Soul (desires). Thus, being has an extraordinarily high value in the Neoplatonic ontological order as it is the first and generator of all other hypostases. Circling back to the difference between the intelligible world and the sensible world, all that has been discussed above has been regarding the intelligible world. The sensible world, on the other hand, consists of individual souls generated by the Soul. The individual souls are ordered in based on what functions and activities they do. 

The basic hierarchy of sensible things is as follows: plants (p) < non-human animals (n) < humans (h). Again, the hierarchy of souls is established based on the properties or functions that each category of sensible thing performs. (p) executes vegetative functions like nutrition, growth, reproduction. (n) executes all vegetative function and all sensitive functions (sense perception, locomotion). Lastly, (h) executes vegetative and sensitive and rational functions. These rational functions include intellect (theoretical things such as math and science) and practical intellect (freely chosen actions, understanding that each situation is part of a greater whole, etc.). This hierarchical arrangement comes naturally as a result of this order where (h) has everything and more that (n) has and (n) has everything and more that (p) has. Thus, in Plotinus’ view, because humans execute the greatest number of functions, humans are at the top of the hierarchy of being.

The last thing to include here is Plotinus' discussion of privations. In order to answer the question of how evil could exist if the One (the foundation for all else) was Good, Plotinus posits the idea of privation. Augustine expands and adapts this idea in an attempt to answer why evil exists with an all-good God, but for the sake of this essay, it is suffice to say that a privation is a lack or dearth of something. Therefore, evil is the dearth of good, rather than being a thing in and of itself. While this creates other issues that Augustine has to deal with, it sidesteps the issue of why evil would exist in a world derived from an all-good God: evil doesn’t exist. This is related to other dichotomies that Plotinus believed fundamental: Good/Evil, Being/Privation, Actuality/Potentiality, Form/Matter (in each of these cases, the former is greater than the latter).

As this context relates to Premise 1, I argue that Augustine bases his understanding of corruptibility on the Being/Privation dichotomy and thus expands on Plotinus’ original hierarchy. As mentioned briefly in the Premise 1 section, I believe that Augustine posits Premise 1 because of his belief that being is greater than not being. In the Neoplatonic ontological hierarchy, not only is the One (and things related to the One such as being and unity) the founding force, there is a direct understanding that being is greater than privation. Thus, it is not a large jump in reasoning to say that if something always has being, it is greater than something that possibly will cease having being. In other words, something with the guaranteed being (incorruptible) is greater than something with the possibility of privation (corruptible). This said Augustine adds a new class into the hierarchy of sensible things. By stating that incorruptibility is greater than corruptibility and that there are beings with the property of incorruptibility, it follows that these beings can be ranked in the Neoplatonic hierarchy. Augustine seems to reach up (in the same way that Anselm seems to reach down) in the hierarchy, stating that there is something greater than humans which execute the ration function (and all lower functions as well). This something greater are the divine (angels, God, etc.) as they not only execute the rational function and all functions below that, but also execute the function of incorruptibility or eternal being. Thus the new hierarchy is in Augustine’s approximation is as follows: Incorruptible Beings > Rational Beings> Sensitive Beings > Vegetative Beings> Bodily Beings. In addition to philosophical context, it is also important to consider theological context when analyzing Augusitne’s work. 

Theological Context and Implications

Having considered the Neoplatonic hierarchy’s relationship to Premise 1, this section looks at Augusitne’s theological context implications for Augustine’s greater theology. The primary theological methodological framework that Augustine applies is summed up in the phrase ‘fides quarens intellectum’ or ‘faith seeking understanding.’ In order to understand how this applies we must first understand that Augustine divided between two kinds of learning: learning from authority and learning from reason. Augustine believed that the primary and most important part of learning when it came to God was authority. Yet, this does not mean reason should be cast aside.  Ian Logan points out that Augustine, in De Doctrina Christiana, explicitly acknowledges how invaluable reason is as a dialectic tool to resolve questions and seeming contradictions in scripture (Logan, Reading Anselm’s Proslogion, pp. 22–23). Thus, “faith seeking understanding” means that Augustine operated from a base of faith, looking to understand or use reason in order to gain greater knowledge (usually of God). When looking at his theological methodology in relation to revealed and natural theology, it seems that Augustine adopts a stance that the basic theological truths must be rooted in revelation and authority (revealed theology), but as problems or questions arise, subsequent theological truths could be arrived at using logic (natural theology). Anselm seems to follow Augusitne’s style of using reason with a foundation of faith in the Proslogion as well. 

As this framework relates to the argument about corruptibility above, it seems that assumptions made about God in Premise 2 (and the steps related to that assumptions thereafter) are rooted in this ‘fides quarens intellectum’ theological methodology. While this may not be a bad thing for Augustine’s argument (as the scope of his argument is internal), there is a large leap or assumption that God is this Ω being. Because of what Anselm was trying to prove, this jump was a very weak link in his chain of reasoning. While it is definitely relevant in Augusitne’s argument, again, because of his goal, this “faith seeking reason”-based assumption about God does not leave Augustine in as vulnerable of a position as when Anselm makes the leap. Given its relevance, it is interesting to note what the assumption that Ω is God implies for Augusinte’s greater theology. 

It seems that by associating God with Ω, Augustine implicitly limits the omnipotence of God to that which is bounded by human logic. In other words, it implies that God cannot do what is logically impossible. In this case, God cannot be something greater than the greatest or most supreme being. If God were not limited by the laws of human logic, while it would be incomprehensible to philosophers, Premise 2 would not necessarily be true. Note that this is by no means a knock on Augusitne’s theology or apologetics, but rather, is an implication of this assumption. It seems then, that Augusinte’s “omnipotent” has shifted from able to do anything at all but, to anything within the bounds of logic. While this has little bearing on the ontological status of Ω, this is a logical extension of Augustine’s reasoning.

Conclusion

After an in-depth dissection of Augusitne’s argument for the incorruptibility of God, it seems Part 1 relatively convincingly shows that Augustine’s logical forms are valid. Yet, when looking at the context in Part 2, questions remain. While the Neoplatonic ontological hierarchy is clearly defined and Augusitne’s logic seems to make sense within that system, the foundations of the hierarchy still seem arbitrary to me. This may be because I have not studied Plotinus at the depth necessary to fully grasp the concepts laid out, but, for instance, why does something necessarily need to be greater if it has more properties than another? Is orange paint greater than red paint because it includes yellow paint and red paint in it? Also, who decides what these divisions and properties are? Additionally, Augustine’s theological framework of “faith seeking understanding” still requires a baseline “faith” or trust in authority. While this is not necessarily a bad or incorrect position to hold (particularly in a theological understanding), it makes Augustine’s philosophical position harder to fully accept if you are not already a Christian. Moreover, there seem to be ramifications on Augustine’s larger theological system by stating Ω; namely, that God's omnipotence is limited. While this is not an inescapable corner to be in, the Christian philosopher does seem to have to do some mental gymnastics to maintain exactly the orthodox view. Despite all of this criticism, though, I would argue that Agustine’s argument was successful for what it set out to do. Within the philosophical and theological systems Augustine ascribes to, he has given a solid argument for why God is incorruptible (which furthers his argument against the Manichaean anti-God figure).