The Demonic in Fear and Trembling

THE DEMONIC IN FEAR AND TREMBLING

Philosophy

This paper claims that through the analogy of Agnete and the Merman, Kierkegaard reveals that the counterpart of faith is the demonic, which can be seen as an entirely new category since it incorporates elements of both the ethical and the religious. It will attempt to demonstrate this by describing Kierkegaard’s three stages of life (focusing particularly on the ethical and the religious), describing the original reference of Agnete and the Merman, describing the analogy of the merman, reiterating the main takeaways from the analogy, and proposing that the analogy should change the reader’s interpretation of ideas found throughout Fear and Trembling.

Kierkegaard’s Three Stages of Existence

To begin, and in order to fully understand the merman analogy, this paper will assert some basic points made earlier in the Fear and Trembling regarding the Kierkegaard’s three stages of existence: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious (focusing specifically on examples from Fear and Trembling and Abraham).

The aesthetic stage assesses life based on pleasure and pain and is the lowest stage of existence because of how poorly it unifies the Self. Kierkegaard conceptualized three stages of existence to explain how people attempt to unify the Self. Here, Kierkegaard differentiates between being human and becoming a Self. In his eyes, the Self is normative and is not something one is born into. It is an ongoing process of development that stands as an accomplishment. It is important to note that these stages should be thought of as comportments, stances, or orientations rather than an order in development. The lowest of these stages, according to Kierkegaard, is the aesthetic stage. The aesthetic stage is marked by an assessment of life, based on the maximization of pleasure and the minimization of pain. While this stage does encapsulate the stereotypical hedonist, it also includes individuals such as artist or people in theoretical pursuits. A major problem with this stage is the idea of diminishing returns. Because the basis of this stage is pleasure and pain and humans easily grow bored of doing the same thing, the individual in this stage will have to regularly (if not constantly) shift from one pursuit to the next. Moreover, while this way of life is sure to be full of unique experiences, life may be only that: a bundle of experiences. This is why the aesthetic stage of existence is the lowest. It offers no consistency. The individual in this stage will not have a Self, but at best, a collection of loosely connected pleasurable experiences. In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard (as De Silentio) devotes most of his time to differentiating between the ethical and the religious, but there is still talk of the aesthetic. For instance, the four analogies in Problema III can be seen as attempts to underscore the difference between aesthetic concealment (where someone can speak but will not speak in order to save someone) and religious concealment (where someone cannot speak and is going to kill/sacrifice someone) (Lippitt 138-139). The stage above this aesthetic stage is the second highest stage: the ethical.

The ethical stage is tied intimately to the concept of infinite resignation, which includes ideas such as passion, resignation, the infinite, communicability, and Hegelian ethics. While the aesthetic stage assesses everything in terms of pleasure and pain, the ethical assess everything in terms of good and evil. This can come in the form of roles and duties. For example, in Either/Or Judge William points to marriage as a quintessential example of living the ethical life. The ethical life offers significantly more unity and consistency than the aesthetic stage and is, therefore, a higher stage of existence. It is noted in Fear and Trembling, though, that it is not easy to enter into the ethical stage because this stage requires infinite resignation. The first requirement for infinite resignation is passion. Passion not in the sense of something that an individual really enjoys, but something that the individual loves so much that it is identity-conferring. Take, for example, the “lad” in Fear and Trembling. His passion is the princess (FT 71). He is not diluted, confused, or cowardly in his love for the princess and he has such an intense love for her that it becomes the central pivot of the lad's identity (FT 72). The princess unifies the lad’s Self, giving him both purpose and direction. What makes this passion uniquely part of infinite resignation, though, is its impossibility (FT 72). Thinking again about the lad, it is humanly impossible for him to get with the princess. The passion in infinite resignation must be humanly unattainable. That being said, the person in the ethical stage does not give up on the passion, but rather moves the passion from the finite to the infinite. In making this movement, they acknowledge that they will not be happy in this world, and thus resign it. In doing so, they must also resign the entire finite world. Simultaneously to their resignation, individuals of the ethical stage of life must trust that in another life (such as the afterlife), their passion can be attained. Therefore, the individual's love now has eternal validity, giving way to a consciousness of the eternal. In short, because the individual's passion (which is the basis for their identity) is now infinite, their Self will be unified in a much deeper way that the individual in the aesthetic stage of existence. It is important to note, also, that this stage of life is communicable. Even if an outsider is to disagree with why or how one reaches the ethical, the reasoning can be communicated. Kierkegaard ties this also to Hegelian ethics, which requires communication. Hegelian ethics takes Kantian ethics and adds history/society. In this system, identity and morality are found in the State. For an action to be ethical, it must not only follow the categorical imperative, but also be communicable and a universally understandable (again, not universally understood, but at the very least, understandable). Yet, despite all of this, it is clear from the text that one of the main reasons for writing Fear and Trembling is precisely to point out weaknesses of the ethical stage. Kierkegaard exposes these weaknesses in his discussion of the religious stage.

The religious stage is the highest stage and can be understood by examining specific attributes of faith such as how faith relates to infinite resignation, the concept of the double movement, the personal nature of faith, and the hidden/incommunicable nature of faith, becoming, and the teleological suspension of the ethical. For Kierkegaard, there are two types of people living the religious life: the Pagan and the Christian. The religious pagan believes that the divine is found within. Examples of this, according to the Kierkegaard, are ancient Greeks such as Socrates. For one living this self-reliant religious existence, there was unity of Self higher than either the aesthetic or the ethical. The second kind of religious person that Kierkegaard talks about is the Christian, which he considered the higher of the two. In this view, there is a holy transcendent Other and requires faith. Faith is a vital component to the religious stage. To enter into faith, one must have first experienced infinite resignation. This means that they must have a passion which they resign to the infinite, just like the individual of the ethical stage. The catch is that they make a “double movement.” Having spent all their energy and will moving into the ethical stage and abstracting their passion into the infinite, they rely on the “absurd” to make the second movement of faith. The “absurd,” in this context, can be understood as God. The individual of faith believes that, through the “absurd,” the passion which has been resigned to the infinite will be attained in this life. In this way, the person of faith returns to the finite. Thus, not only does the person of the Christian religious stage of existence have a unified self in the same way that the ethical person does, they are able to embrace the finite world. More than that, it could be said that they embrace the finite world more fully than even the aesthetic. It is important to note that this all arises from a personal or individual journey with the “absurd.” Because it is so personal, Kierkegaard claims that there is no way for anyone else to understand. Therefore, in times of trial, one of the greatest sources of anguish for the person of faith is the incommunicability of their struggle and their faith. Another important note is that faith is a continuous process which must be constantly attended to. It is not something that can be won, bought, or achieved as a one-time event (as Kierkegaard puts it, just because one is baptized into Christendom, does not mean that they are adherents to the Christian faith) All of that being said, though, there seem to be some major implications. Among them is the teleological suspension of the ethical. Teleological suspension of the ethical means that at times, individuals of faith must the transcend the ethical in favor of the higher telos (end or purpose), which is love and commitment to God. This brings the individual or “particular” higher than the “universal” because of an “absolute relationship with the absolute.” The latter half of this means that the individual’s “absolute” highest relationship is the “absolute” (God). Because Kierkegaard equates the ethical to the Hegelian universal, this suspension is a direct challenge to Hegelian ethics. Kierkegaard is implying that sometimes the commitment to God is higher than and contrary to the universal ethical.

Note that, despite the nuances that could be discussed based on this general overview of the three stages of existence, this essay will only expand upon ideas that relate to Problema III’s Agnete and the Merman analogy (due to the scope of the paper).

The Demonic in the Analogy of Agnete and the Merman

The following section will outline the analogy of the merman by first looking at the original reference, then looking at how De Silentio changes it, and then by highlighting some main takeaways from the analogy.

Original Reference of Agnete and the Merman

In order to better understand De Silentio’s alterations, this section will look at the themes of the original Danish ballad of Agnete and the Merman. Kierkegaard barely explains the original reference, focusing much more on his own version of the tale. What he does disclose of the original is that there is a merman who seduces a human woman and that they fall in love. He also makes a side comment on page 121 that “in the legend Agnete is by no means guiltless either” and later describes her as a “woman who ‘hankers for the interesting’” (FT 121) His description gives a basic understanding of the original ballad that the audience at the time of his writing would have understood but barely gives any context to a modern, non-Danish audience. The original folk-song depicts a merman who calls out of the waters to a human woman (Agnete) to come with him and be his love (Thorne). Agnete does so, living with him in the waters and having two to seven children (depending on which version of the tale is told) (Thorne, Stone, Kristin, Findlay). After a certain number of years with the merman and the merchildren (again variant depending on the version), Agnete hears church bells from the surface of the water (Thorne, Stone, Kristin, Findlay). Upon hearing this (and with persuasion from her mother in certain versions), she re-enters the surface world and joins her human family and children (Thorne, Stone, Kristin, Findlay). Moreover, in Danish culture, stories involving mercreature generally involved trickery, seduction, deceit, and/or tragedy (Stone). Further, mercreatures generally not only have the power to seduce but have immense otherworldly powers (as touched upon by the “calming of the seas” in Kierkegaard’s alteration) (Kristin). With this cultural context, Kierkegaard’s metaphor becomes even more powerful. Innocence, humility, and faith produce love so powerful that it supersedes everything, even the supernatural powers of the merman. Another theme in the original folk-song is the Pagan-Christian divide. The merman, a classic pagan symbol in that culture, represents the old fleshly ways (De Silentio touches upon by calling “nature’s passion,” a carnal and earthly force, the merman’s strength) (Stone). The church bells and the call of the family represent the new Christian ways (Stone). These themes in the original context are inverted in De Silentio’s alterations, powerfully questioning the institution of the Church and glorifying aspects of the Pagan (which he does elsewhere in his work) (Stone). Moreover, there are specific lines in the original reference which dramatically depict the merman and Agnete diving into the sea. The descent into these watery depths implies an inwardness, a recess from the external world. Kierkegaard even points this out himself in his Journals (Journal EE-KK 495). Thus, it seems that his the focus of his alteration (inwardness or silence) may have been inspired by a theme already present in the original work. Understanding the cultural context that Kierkegaard is working for allows for a deeper understanding of not only his references but also the purpose and power behind his alterations.

De Silentio’s Analogy

This section will examine the initial change in the analogy. Then it will examine the major alteration in the analogy and it implications. Lastly, it will look at repentance and the demonic.

De Silentio alters both Agnete and the merman to set up his analogy. The changes that he makes to the general story is tied to the changes he makes to Agnete. Rather than having Agnete be one who “hankers for interest,” Agnete is one of pure innocence, humility, and faith in the merman from the moment she lays eyes on him (FT 120). Additionally, there is an initial change to the merman’s disposition. Kierkegaard paints him as a soulless seducer who was originally going to kill Agnete by bringing her to her watery demise in the rough seas. Agnete’s innocence and faith, in a sense, defeat the merman. Agnete’s protection of pure innocence forces the merman’s eyes open the possibility of true love and is unable to seduce her, for to seduce her would be merely to have her as “just a prize” (FT 120). Because of this, he faces the first wave of despair for his original intentions towards her.

After this, De Silentio makes a further (and key) alteration to the merman character by giving him human consciousness, thus enabling the possibility of faith, repentance, demonic silence, and sin (FT 121). In looking specifically at the possibility for faith, De Silentio states that this consciousness allows the merman to be a “hero” (FT 122). Here he is likely referencing a tragic hero, who falls into the ethical. Further, though, it seems that this consciousness allows for faith. This can be seen in Kierkegaard’s journal entries. Around the same place that Kierkegaard makes a reference to the inwardness of diving into the ocean (from the previous paragraph), he writes about the line “ [...]if a merman could have faith [...]” (Journal EE-KK 495). In his response, he states sorrowfully, “had I [Kierkegaard] faith, I would have stayed with Regine” (Journal EE-KK 495). Regine was the love of his life and fiancée, but there is no space in the scope of this essay to fully explore the implications of these two passages on his personal life. Despite this, the context of the line and the context of his journals clearly highlight that this secondary alteration is crucial for this merman character and the metaphor’s meaning as a whole. Thus, having gained a human consciousness which enables him to make new decisions. Agnete has saved him from his old ways as a seducer but her feels immense guilt because of his original intentions with her. This leaves him with two different options of reconciliation: repentance-alone or repentance-with Agnete.

In focusing what Kierkegaard states next, this paragraph explores repentance, demonic silence, and sin. Repentance-with is a disclosed repentance and repentance-alone is a concealed repentance. Repentance-alone calls for the merman to make Agnete as unhappy as possible in order save her from himself and his treacherous ways, knowing that she deserves better. He knows that a candid confession will not work because Agnete is protected by her innocence. Thus, he must “arouse the dark” passions in her in order to make her more selfish, and therefore more easily deceived (FT 121). This section has striking parallels with the first “sub-Abraham” in the beginning of the book who scares Isaac, but then loses his relationship with Isaac and the world. His making her unhappy, though, makes him even more unhappy. This is because of his initial mistake and his current actions which are shrouded in silence. With this the demonic enters. The demonic side tells him that the more he suffers, the better because he deserves it. De Silentio then claims that through this demonic silence, like a person with faith, the merman is an individual above the universal. One way to interpret this is that, the individual recognizes the universal, but refuses to submit his individuality to the universal, thus remaining in unmediated silence. This is proven by the fact that the silence is voluntary. By speaking the merman would not only be in the universal, but would be one of the noblest of tragic heroes. Because this is not the case, the merman is outside the universal and thus able to enter into “an absolute relationship with the absolute” (which was explained earlier in this paper). That being said, at this point, the merman again has two options: to remain in silence or to be saved in Agnete. If he is to remain in silence, he would rely on the counter-paradox that the divine would save Agnete (this, De Silentio compress the monks in monasteries). This option seems to remain in the same disposition of seeing, but ignoring the universal. The only change is that he comes into a distant and impersonal relationship to the universal (like that one who has infinite resignation). The second option is that he is saved in Agnete. In this scenario, he comes out of the universal through his guilt and can only return to the universal through his guilt. This guilt, is parallels Abraham’s temptation. These are the two mechanism through which one enters or exits the universal. After this mechanism, the merman can enter into the “absolute relationship to the absolute.” He does this by making the “infinite moment of repentance,” which parallels the infinite movement of resignation (FT 125). Additionally, for both scenarios, the passion must be total, otherwise it will divide the self. Moreover, both actions take all of their human strength, and rely on the strength of the absurd to move back into the finite (for to be with Agnete, the merman must move back to reality) (FT 125). The big difference, then, is where he came from. De Silentio claims the merman came from sin (FT 124) . According to Kierkegaard (and written out more explicitly in writings such as Sickness Unto Death) sin is the opposite of faith. Thus, while there are striking parallels in the mechanisms by which the merman and Abraham come into “an absolute relationship with the absolute,” they are based in entirely opposite concepts: sin and faith respectively. The biggest divide on the surface, then, is the reason behind each characters’ silence from earlier in the text. The sinful nature of the demonic enables everyone understand the merman, thus making the silence voluntary. Abraham in his righteousness, on the other hand, remains incomprehensible and unable (rather than unwilling) to speak. All of this being said one can clearly see the dichotomy between the demonic and faith as two sides of the same coin: distinctly different, but intimately related.

Takeaways from Agnete and the Merman Analogy

This section will look at the takeaways of four analogies as a whole and then proceed to look more specifically at the main points of the Agnete and the Merman analogy.

In the context of the entire Problema, the merman analogy falls in line with the other three analogies in that they all contrast aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. Specifically, characters in all three analogies are in deep anguish due to their silence. The point of these analogies, though, is to highlight the differences between the kinds of silence depicted and the kind that Abraham suffers. The analogous examples have the same surface suffering (silence) but can be understood. This contrasts Abraham’s silence which is involuntary due to his inability to communicate/mediate his struggle, lest he fall to the temptation of the ethical. Thus, the four analogies (the merman included) shines a “negative” light onto Abraham and his silence. Though he remains incomprehensible, these analogies help with one’s understanding of his situation.

Still examining the takeaways from these analogies, but focusing specifically on Agnete and the Merman, the merman analogy is set apart from the others because it introduces a vital theme in many interpretations of Fear and Trembling as a whole: the demonic. In the demonic, there are two kinds of repentance-alone and repentance-with. Repentance-alone mirrors infinite resignation, while repentance-with mirrors faith. When one is in repentance-alone, the torment of repentance is the recognition of the universal (in line with infinite resignation), but the rejection of it in favor for the individual (different from infinite resignation). In hindsight, it seems that the reason for this rejection is sin, which may be why it is different from infinite resignation in that way. Regardless, there are two options within repentance-alone, which are becoming a demon and making no attempt to save Agnete. In becoming the demon, the merman acts like sub-Abraham one, and tries to arouse dark passions in Agnete in order to rip her away from him (so that she can be free). This is motivated by the universal, but is done outside of it. Because he is pushing the core of his identity away from him, the merman “is brought to nothing” (FT 123). The second option of making no attempt to save Agnete is the counter-paradox mentioned earlier, where, at the cost of his own torment, the merman remains where he is but trusts that the divine will save Agnete (which mirrors monks in monasteries). This is again motivated by the universal, but done outside of it. In this case, despite the peace that the merman finds, the world is lost to him as he gives up the finite (like infinite resignation). Then there is repentance-with. In repentance-with, the merman seeks to belong fully to Agnete. Before doing so, though, he must make the move of infinite repentance (which I take is repentance-alone, based on the parallels to infinite resignation and faith). This first step takes all of the merman’s strength (like infinite resignation). But, to be with Agnete, the merman must move back to reality. This requires a reliance on the absurd for the second movement (just like faith). This puts the merman in “an absolute relationship with the absolute.” The biggest difference (as iterated in the previous section), is that the merman came through sin, while Abraham came through righteousness. Having noted that not only the structure, but the very words are the same in many instances, it is clear that the demonic is the counterpart to faith, differentiated by sin.

Reconsidering Fear and Trembling Based on the Demonic

Having thoroughly displayed the unique status of the demonic, this paper now seeks to reconsider Fear and Trembling as a whole and defend its view in light of other scholarship. It will do this by explaining a common categorization of the demonic and re-contextualizing “aesthetic.” After that, it will briefly arguing against a potential categorization of the demonic with faith.

Some scholars have argued that the demonic should be categorized under the aesthetic stage of life, but example a deeper look into the meaning of “aesthetic” in the context of the four analogies reveals otherwise. Commentators such as Kellenberger and possibly Lippitt argue that the demonic is part of the aesthetic stage of life. Kellenberger clearly states that the demonic is to be categorized under the aesthetic stage of life, referencing a continuation of the discussion from Either/Or (Kellenberger 41). Also, Lippitt categorizes the demonic as being part of the aesthetic, but it is harder to tell how exactly Lippitt is interpreting the word “aesthetic.” He claims that the demonic is used as aesthetic counterpoint to the religious in order to highlight the uniqueness of Abraham's faith (and specifically, silence) (Lippitt 138-139). He does not qualify the aesthetic here with an explicit comment that it should be seen differently from the aesthetic stage of existence. Thus, it is likely that he is conceiving of it in the same way that Kellenberger is, but there is no way to be completely certain.

The reason why the mainstream view seems incorrect is that there is a shift in Kierkegaard’s usages of the word “aesthetic” and read plainly, the demonic does not fit category of aesthetic. The shift occurs at the beginning of Problema III as De Silentio outlines what will happen in this section. He first equates the aesthetic, as he is using it in this section, to the interesting (FT 109). He then proceeds to state that the “the category of the interesting is, moreover, a borderline one, it marks the boundary between the aesthetic and the ethical” (FT 110). In treating the aesthetic in this section as the “interesting,” rather than the aesthetic from Either/Or, the analogies and the category of the demonic make much more sense. Moreover, in instances, the word is used in to describe dramatic happenings such as coincidence, which does not relate directly to the aesthetic stage of existence. It is clear that in understanding the demonic, De Silentio uses aesthetic in the sense of the “interesting” rather than the aesthetic in the sense of the “aesthetic stage of existence”. Other commentator have provided unsatisfactory answers as to why aesthetic continue to read in the same way that it was in Either/Or. Kellenberger tries to reconcile this by claiming that demonic is aesthetic (from Either/Or) with “magnanimity,” but this seems to be an forced reading of the text. It feels much easier to explain the hidden nature in this situation through a new category that recognizes where the individual recognizes the universal, but rejects it in elevation of the individual, than an aesthetic reading where one “savor[s] at once their generous act[s] and the mystification of others caused by secretiveness” (Kellenberger 42). A person in the aesthetic stage measure their life in terms of pleasure and pain. One who measures their life in such a way would not willingly enter into marriage knowing that it would not only cause their spouse great pain but generate continuous multi-faceted anguish as well. The pleasure of “generous acts” and “mystification of others” would surely be outweighed by the anguish of silence which Fear and Trembling so emphasizes (Kellenberger 42). To force the demonic into the category of the aesthetic stage of existence ignores either the basic definition of the aesthetic stage of existence or the analogy of Agnete and the Merman in Fear and Trembling. Either way, the situation must be reinterpreted and the reading that this paper proposes aligns both with the text and the definition of the aesthetic stage of life.

A potential argument that this paper foresees putting the demonic into the category of faith under the pagan religious stage of existence, but a closer look at the Pagan religious (discussed earlier in this paper) should bring light to this issue. To reiterate, the key difference is between the pagan faith and the Christian faith is that, according to Kierkegaard, the pagan faith finds the divine within, while the Christian faith finds the divine externally. Initially, some may be tempted to categorize the demonic with the pagan because both seem to rely on the self to achieve faith. The problem with this view is that it fails to recognize the reliance on the absurd and the role of sin. Similar to Christian faith, the demonic relies on the “absurd” to reach the divine. Though the demonic does rely on their own strength and the strength of their guilt to get into the first stage of repentance (relevance-alone), the key step to full repentance (repentance-with) relies on something outside of the individual to reach the divine. Moreover, the demonic comes from a place of intense sin, but the Pagan, on the other hand, does not ever recognize sin (SUD 114-115). These two gaps cannot be overlooked and the demonic, therefore, should not be put into the category of the pagan religious stage of existence. Again, the demonic should have its own category.

Conclusion

To conclude, this paper claims that through the analogy of Agnete and the Merman, Kierkegaard reveals that the counterpart of faith is the demonic, which stands as its own category. This paper does so by looking at the three stages of existence, looking at the analogy (both in terms of its original reference and in terms of De Silentio’s alteration), reviewing the main points of the merman tale, and reinterpreting categories put out by previous scholars.

Works Cited

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